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Abstract 
Business accelerators are one of the best sources of financing for seed-stage accelerators – 
the conclusion one can make based on the quite scant accelerator research. However, since 
the studies of accelerators have mostly based on the data on American top-accelerators, 
little is known about the success-factors of accelerators in other contexts. This article 
analyzes whether the success-factors found to influence accelerators are similar to these 
previously found in a different context of Estonia, where, despite the short period of the 
free market economy, a highly successful startup ecosystem has developed. To capture the 
full effect of accelerators in Estonia the complete sample on Estonian accelerated startups 
and accelerators is provided, which is unique in accelerator research, where mostly 
crowdsourced, incomplete datasets are used. The analysis from regression models revealed 
that size of funds gained from accelerators, average yearly sales and employees’ growth 
and being a software company are predictive of success of accelerated startups. The internal 
and external success-factors that are linked to the fortune of accelerators are explored 
through semi-structured interviews with accelerator representatives. Accelerators owe their 
success to their intrinsic qualities, from which social networks creation by accelerator, deal 
flow/startup selection and reputation were considered important, but the analysis confirms 
that their external context, most importantly policy environment and presence of human 
capital, also strongly influence their success and creation. 
Keywords – Accelerator, innovation, startups, growth metrics, company success.  
 
1. Introduction 
Differently from the factors supporting stable economic growth, successful startup 
companies can, in favorable conditions, bring about an abrupt change into the economic 
development of the country  – they create jobs (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, & Miranda, 
2016), encourage further job creation in related industries (Bos & Stam, 2014) and this not 
only in their main location, but also in areas where startups expand (Acs & Mueller, 2008). 
These innovative, scalable companies in charge of sustaining the economic growth by 
bringing disruptive destruction to an old economic structure (Schumpeter, 1942/2003) are 
mostly technology startups, that need large investments in the development phase, where 
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there are no or little real financial gains from the customers. Different measures (venture 
capitalist funding, angel investors, public grants and other policies, competition awards, 
accelerators, loans, crowdfunding) are created by stakeholders who try to help companies 
past this stage for great ideas to be realized. One of these is a startup accelerator – the topic 
of the present article. This is ‘a fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship 
and educational components, that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day’ (Cohen 
& Hochberg, 2014: 4). 
 The present decade has seen the rise of the creation of startup accelerators as means 
for the promotion of disruptive innovation by high-growth startups (Hochberg, 2016; 
Regmi, Ahmed, & Quinn, 2015). Business acceleration by accelerator programs has proven 
fruitful for accepted startups. Examples like lessening time for exit for Y Combinator and 
Techstars participants (Barnes, 2016; Smith & Hannigan, 2015), quicker follow-up funding 
from venture capitalists (Smith & Hannigan, 2015), speeding up product launch (Bliemel et 
al., 2016) and increasing longevity of start-ups (Bliemel & Flores, 2015) say a lot. But they 
say this lot mostly about establised top accelerators, since accelerator research bases mainly 
on the American or international data (with some exceptions, e.g. Europe (Yusubova & 
Clarysse, 2016), Singapore (Yin & Luo, 2018), Chile (Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 
2018)). US-based accelerators also play unproportional role in the explorations of how 
accelerators do internationally  – by the data of Global Accelerator Report 2016 there were 
178 accelerators in the US and Canadian area, where 44% from all the accelerators locate 
(Gust, 2017). But as grand social theories cannot be assumed to hold in every context, 
regardless of a socio-political context of a country under inquiry (Daloz, 2013), the same 
applies for social trends as startup acceleration is. What happens when the context is 
changed from the US with its stable economic development to a post-socialist transition 
economy that today is a world-renowned digital success-story? There is a lack in 
comparisons of the effects of accelerators in different regions and contexts (Hochberg, 
2016: 48) and therefore offering contextual diversity for studies of accelerators analyzing 
Estonian accelerator success factors is one of the reasons for this article. 
 One of the contextual aspects, that should require us to carefully consider whether it 
would be fruitful to choose more inductive approaches instead of creating universalistic 
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theories in measuring economic stimulus such as accelerators, is that accelerator-treated 
areas see a rise in startup funding environment, that also contributes to the funding 
environment of non-accelerated startups (Fehder & Hochberg, 2014). These types of 
ecosystem effects suggest that in areas where accelerators have been working longer, 
economic environment may contribute to creation of even more events that help startups 
through the development phase. In other words – present accelerators in America make 
context well-prepared for other American accelerators to emerge, but in contexts where 
accelerators emerged later (e.g. Estonia), startup ecosystem development may need more 
effort by first accelerators themselves. Policy context, governmental support and 
educational background of a country are amongst other external factors that are, although 
found influencing startup ecosystem creation (Tripathi, Seppänen, Boominathan, Oivo, & 
Liukkunen, 2019) and not accelerators directly, probably also influencing accelerator 
formation, since accelerators are usually also private business organizations interested in a 
functioning ecosystem. Since there are several external factors that affect whether a startup 
accelerator is a proportional measure for helping startups to develop, focusing mainly on 
the context of a country with long-developed economic ecosystems may narrow the 
phenomenon of accelerators and their success-factors in later theory formation. For these 
reasons this article seeks to provide tools to analyse different contexts in more detail. 
Analysis of external success factors helps to structurally understand these contextual 
differences, providing basis for country comparisons. Adding these to the internal ones in 
analysis is the main contribution of the study. Understanding the factors, which are out of 
control of accelerators that affect whether an accelerator with its economic effects can 
flourish or not, is important for policy suggestions in concrete country contexts. 
Accelerators act as enablers for new companies, with complex investor-relationships and 
business models. They cannot be assumed to be similarly influenced by economic, 
educational, policy and other relevant contexts as companies are. Therefore it is worth 
studying what influences specifically accelerator-type business models. 
 The economic ecosystem and other extrinsic contextual factors are only part of the 
influencers of accelerators’ success – several of the success-factors, such as startup 
selection criteria (Yin & Luo, 2018; Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016), social networks creation 
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(Bandera & Thomas, 2018; Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016), mentorship quality (Gonzalez-
Uribe & Leatherbee, 2018; Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016), focusing on certain stages 
(Kushner, 2018), fund allocation (Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2018) and having an 
universalistic or specialized program type (Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016) are intrinsic. These 
program success factors that are most effective for startups should be studied more 
(Hochberg, 2016). 
 This article seeks to fulfill all of these three aforementioned gaps by aiming to 
explore the success-factors of Estonian accelerators and accelerated startups. With this goal 
in mind, it contributes to the scarce literature (Hochberg, 2016: 35; Yin & Luo, 2018) on 
the recent phenomenon of accelerators by asking how can success of an accelerated startup 
be explained by the success metrics of startups in Estonia, a country where accelerators 
have had little time to develop. Next, after exploring patterns behind success of accelerated 
companies, in-depth discovery of the influencing factors of different acceleration programs 
provided in Estonia is given by interviewing representatives of the accelerators on what 
influences accelerators themselves. Questions leading this part of the study are: what are 
the most important internal factors for accelerator success?; what external factors 
accelerator executives consider having important effects during times of accelerators 
creation and further in their development? 
 These tasks are achieved drawing upon the quantifiable as well as qualitative data 
on Estonian accelerators and startups that have used their services. A novel dataset 
consisting of all the startups funded by all the four Estonian-located accelerator programs 
over the time period from 2012 to the first half of the 2018 was developed. The data on 
accelerators is usually limited and subject to several limitations (Hochberg, 2016: 35), so 
this is the third contribution of this study. Since Estonia is a small country, the possibility to 
contact all the accelerator program founders and have all the participating startups listed 
makes the dataset unique in that it represents the complete sample of accelerator 
participants. To capture the phenomenon of young accelerators, the success of startups gone 
through accelerator programs was tracked and the qualities and development needs that 
accelerator founders identify in semi-structured interviews explored. The analysis from 
regression models revealed that the size of funds, average yearly sales and employees 
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growth and being a software company are predictive of success of accelerated startups. 
Interviews showed that accelerators owe their success both to their intrinsic and extrinsic 
influencers. From the first ones social networks creation, deal flow/startup selection and 
reputation were considered the most important. External context, most importantly policy 
environment and presence of human capital, also strongly influence success and creation of 
accelerators. The data is then compared to the previous literature to understand whether 
Estonian differing context influences what participants get from accelerator programs. In 
doing that this study is the first to take on the task to map and discover accelerators of 
Estonia and study their outcomes for participants. Research on accelerator phenomenon 
seems to still be in infancy for drawing large conclusions about their performance as 
Hochberg (2016) put it some years ago, so qualitative analysis of this type of business 
growth measure could well contribute to the discussion. Therefore using mixed methods is 
the fifth unique contribution. And as results indicate – there are context-specific factors that 
could influence accelerator creation and vitality. 
 
2. Literature review 
Startup accelerator is a growing phenomenon. Y Combinator, the first seed-stage 
accelerator, was founded in 2005 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. To date the community has 
over 4000 founders, with 2 batches added each year. In 2007 Techstars accelerator started 
in Colorado and it has also become one of the leading international accelerators. In the last 
14 years since the first accelerator was born, vast investments into accelerated startups have 
been made. According to the Global Accelerator Report 2016 (Gust, 2017) 579 accelerator 
programs listed have made over 206 740 005 dollars worth of total investments worldwide. 
Despite their great influence on economy, it is surprising that accelerator effects are 
understudied and there is even a confusion around the definition of accelerators. The term 
is often switched with ‘incubators’. Susan G. Cohen and Yael V. Hochberg have aimed to 
explain the differences of these programs in several articles. In this article their definition 
of accelerators is used, stating that an accelerator is ‘a fixed-term, cohort-based program, 
including mentorship and educational components, that culminates in a public pitch event 
or demo-day’ (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014: 4). Schooling through specialized programs 
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distinguishes accelerators from incubators that do not usually provide compulsory training 
program, but act more like co-working spaces (Kushner, 2018: 23). The definition also 
allows including both publicly and privately funded programs. In the following analysis 
programs with prolonged mentoring, batches, but also funding for all the participants are 
defined as being accelerators. Although not all programs provide small seed investment, a 
typical accelerator does, taking usually a small share (5-7%) in return or giving it in form of 
a convertible loan (Hochberg, 2016: 32). In sake of adding clearly intensive training 
programs, initial funding in return for shares, a convertible loan or equity-free funding for 
participants in order to make sure their maximum commitment is a criteria for accelerators. 
 What qualities constitute a successful accelerator is not uniformly specified and 
studies use different measures to track this success. Usually mainly factors hereby 
categorized as internal environment factors are considered. These are factors listed in 
Figure 1 that depend on the performance of an accelerator and allow comparisons of 
programs. But analyses that only consider the internal factors do not reckon the contextual 
external aspects an accelerator is influenced by. 
 Startup ecosystems act in conjunction with the events in the surrounding area. As a 
proof of that, establishment of an accelerator is found shifting the equilibrium of overall 
early stage financing in the region, generating more seed and early stage financing 
possibilities also to non-accelerated companies (Fehder & Hochberg, 2014). The effect of 
an event to a country assumably depends on its scale and the size of a country – sometimes 
the whole country is influenced, sometimes a county, economic cluster et cetera. 
Accelerators provide individual ventures but also emerging ecosystems with access to 
expertise and other tangible and intangible infrastructure elements (Goswami, Mitchell, & 
Bhagavatula, 2018). According to that, an area enjoying benefits a post-accelerator-creation 
offers may be very welcoming to other accelerators, whereas in an area where there is no 
accelerator or the benefits of its presence have not yet occured, startup ecosystem 
development may need more effort by first accelerators themselves. Moreover, since 
accelerators are not yet proven concepts, their creation and vitality may be influenced also 
by external factors other than accelerator existence in an area. 
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 World Economic Forum (Foster et al., 2013) has compiled eight main pillars 
influencing entrepreneurial ecosystems: human capital, education, accessible markets, 
funding and finance, regulatory framework and infrastructure, major universities as 
catalysts, cultural support and business support system. Accelerator is a form of business 
support system, which allows us to exclude this pillar from the analysis of accelerators, so 
that six success factors shown in Figure 1 remain to be tested as external influencers of 
accelerators. It is intriguing to discover, whether some of these may be important to 
accelerators specifically. 
 According to this list by World Economic Forum the educational background of an 
area (when combining education and universities as catalysts from this list) is one of the 
focal elements for building a strong ecosystem. Higher-level education in general is 
considered to be a key factor of a successful entrepreneurial activity (Bennett & Dann, 
2000), with conflicting views on specific entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurship 
outcomes (O’Connor, 2013). Innovation by patent intensity is in a positive relation with the 
size of R&D spending and relative number of researchers (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002), 
which indicates the important relationship of innovation and research capacity-building. It 
is supported by the strong co-localization of research and downstream industrial R&D 
(Agrawal & Cockburn, 2003), which the authors would not present as a definite correlation 
between research and innovation. Still, the clustering of research and innovation centers of 
companies to same locations could at least inform us about the ecosystem effects of these 
two factors – similar aspects influence their gathering to same places. 
 Strong educational background, government support, talent supportive policies and 
young talents are key drivers of human capital. Although the strength of human capital is 
strongly linked to the education and training of a person for economists (Becker, n.d.), it is 
worth considering these two concepts equally valid and therefore separately in research 
concerning startups. Qualified human capital is seen as a key driver of a successful startup 
ecosystem (Tripathi et al., 2019). In the subsequent interviews, education and human 
capital were considered as separate criteria. For an accelerator, existing human capital in 
form of strong teams was considered one of the central qualities of the external 
environment, without which startups cannot flourish. Educational context of a society was 
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discussed as a very significant aspect, whereas it was seen having a more long-term effect 
on startups excelling. 
 ‘Regulatory framework and infrastructure’ and ‘Funding and finance’ are hereby 
considered reflecting a factor of ‘Policy direction’ supporting accelerators. Stakeholders’ 
needs influence the type and structure (public, private, specific, generic) of accelerators 
(Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016), which shows how important a role stakeholders (here public 
stakeholders) have on the decision to establish an accelerator program in the first place. 
 Which of these affect accelerators as external success factors is a central focus of 
the subsequent analysis. These external factors are present in the literature about overall 
startup ecosystem, but the problem statement of the present paper requires these contextual 
factors to be added to the analysis of accelerator success, since the leading idea tested in 
this article, for the reasons elaborated in the next subchapter, is that accelerators cannot be 
established or successful without the supportive external environment. Both of these 
environments – external and internal – affect accelerated startups’ success, which is a 
metric of measuring accelerators’ success. The factors hereby considered as influencers of 
accelerator success are portrayed in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Accelerator success metrics and factors influencing it. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on literature in Table 1. 
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What researchers have found to be driving accelerator success are listed in Table 1. Since 
there is much more extensive literature on incubators and startup ecosystems, while at the 
same time accelerators are studied insufficiently, some studies with incubators are also 
added in the list on factors that are not essentially different between the two program types. 
The present study seeks to clarify these gaps in the analysis of internal success factors of 
accelerators, analyzing specifically accelerator internal success factors and ranking these in 
order of salience for Estonian accelerators. The leading question in this part of the study is 
what are the most important internal factors for a successful accelerator? 
	
Table 1. Overview of the previous studies about accelerator success (compiled and 
categorized by the author). 
 
 Factors Sources 
 
 
External 
environment 
Business environment Foster et al., 2013* 
Educational environment Bennett & Dann, 2000*; Furman, 
Porter, & Stern, 2002*; Agrawal & 
Cockburn, 2003*; O’Connor, 2013* 
Human capital Tripathi et al., 2019 
Policy direction Foster et al., 2013* 
Accessible markets Foster et al., 2013* 
Cultural support Foster et al., 2013* 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal 
environment 
Startup selection 
possibility/deal flow 
Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016; Yin & 
Luo, 2018 
Social networks creation 
 
Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 
2000*; Miller & Bound, 2011; 
 Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016; Bandera 
& Thomas, 2018 
Strength of mentorship 
 
Miller & Bound, 2011: 26; Hochberg, 
2016: 33; Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016;   
Gonzalez-Uribe & Leatherbee, 2018 
Focusing on stages  Kushner, 2018 
Fund allocation  Miller & Bound, 2011: 26; Radojevich-
Kelley & Hoffman, 2012; Gonzalez-
Uribe & Leatherbee, 2018 
Operating in batches and small 
batch size  
Miller & Bound, 2011: 28; Kim & 
Wagman, 2014; 'Y Combinator: What 
We Do', s.a.; Barnes, 2016 
Program type (horizontal or 
vertical) 
Schwartz & Hornych, 2008*; 
Yusubova & Clarysse, 2016 
 
 
 
STARTUP SUCCESS:  
Speed of follow-up funding Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012; 
Smith & Hannigan, 2015 
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Accelerator  
success metrics 
Increase in firm employment 
level 
Fehder, 2015; Stokan, Thompson, & 
Mahu, 2015* 
Length of survival Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012; 
Regmi et al., 2015; Hallen, Cohen, & 
Bingham, 2017 
Growth in total amount of 
funding 
Fehder, 2015 
* - article about incubators or overall startup ecosystem 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
One criterion from the above list has stayed ambiguous in the literature and its effects on 
accelerator success need to be explained further. It is the correlation between participating 
in a program and having a longeval company, because the increasing lifetime of 
participants is not always evident. While studies listed in Table 1 found accelerator 
participation to increase the length of survival (Hallen et al., 2017; Regmi et al., 2015), this 
evidence seems to be inconsistent. Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2018) found that 
companies are not likely to survive longer when accelerated. Another article discovered, on 
the contrary, that firms accepted are more likely to be exiting through quitting or 
acquisition in comparison to the ones acquiring angel investor funding (Smith & Hannigan, 
2015). Early quitting could even be beneficial, when acceleration program could quickly 
make founders aware of the plausibility of their project, so that they could quit and start 
working with more successful projects. 
 
2.1. External context of Estonian accelerators 
Estonia had four accelerators operating during the period of analysis, three of which mostly 
operate on private (Startup Wise Guys, BuildIt, Gamefounders) and one on public funding 
(Climate-KIC Accelerator). Although private, Gamefounders located in Estonia in 2012-
2014 – the period of government funding. In 2015 the Climate-KIC clean-technology 
accelerator started to operate in Estonia. The first year of the program for Estonian startups 
was held under the auspices of the national accelerator of Poland, but the second year 
marked the beginning of the partnership of EIT Climate-KIC and Estonian Development 
Fund and Estonia became the official partner of this international accelerator, that mostly 
finances its operations from the funds of European Commission. The context of the 
formation of these accelerators is the Estonian startup field, which is as young as its’ 
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indepencence, meaning that private businesses could have been created only since the most 
recent decade of the 20th century, when a country’s government turned from being a 
communist republic of the USSR to the liberal democracy. The business environment and 
accessible foreign markets are under continuous development out of transition economy, 
meaning that comparing these with the US in terms of economic efficiency would still be to 
the disadvantage of Estonia. When USA is in the position of an unchallenged world 
leader startup-quality-wise (score 22.02 by StartupBlink) with quality-score four times 
as high as Israeli’s on the second place (score 5.21), Estonia’s score is 1.52. 
 Estonian business environment ranks close-by USA’s and other world leaders in 
terms of e.g. technical infrastructure, bureaucracy et cetera (StartupBlink, 2019).	While 
domestic demand of Estonia is very strong, innovative startups are looking for international 
markets. Estonian exports are concentrated in low and medium technological goods and 
high value added activities are limited (Euromonitor, 2019). Innovation policies also 
need to be improved, but there are few efforts in this direction (Euromonitor, 2019). 
Estonia is located in the periphery of the European Union, bordered by Russia, which 
makes the transport and infrastructure important for the development of exchange of 
people, goods and services. But developments of transport and infrastructure have not 
been consistent enough, holding back private sector development (Euromonitor, 2019). 
 Regardless of the scarce time-period of companies formation, an internationally 
renown startup ecosystem developed very quickly and world’s rankings of startups’ 
ecosystems have been generous to Estonia (13th). This was mostly driven by the 
successful IT-sector. This success story is found to have been possible owing to the 
contextual differences of smaller countries. In smaller countries like Estonia, where startups 
have lower entry barriers, they mostly focus on international markets and have a tendency 
to create simple solutions to complex problems, which help to stimulate the formation of a 
successful startup ecosystem with all its related benefits. (Dumas, 2014) This is coupled 
with the innovative and capable workforce (Euromonitor, 2019). Human capital is 
important for startup ecosystems. Half a century developed Silicon Valley contributes to 
America’s first position in ecosystem ranking human-capital-wise. It has and still does 
provide people with enterpreneurial mindset with startup experience that is now being used 
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in building up world-best ecosystems in other American cities (6 of the 10 world-leading 
startup ecosystems are located in USA) (StartupBlink, 2019). Entrepreneurial mindset as a 
supportive cultural factor is well advanced in America, where 24% of the people born 
between 1965-1995 own or have owned a small business (Americas SBDC and The Center 
of Generational Kinetics, 2017: 6) with 38 per cent of Millenials having been part of 
starting a new startup company (Americas SBDC and The Center of Generational Kinetics, 
2017: 7). In Estonia, the innovation mindset that was held back during the period of 
Soviet occupation has increased and now Estonia finds itself on the 24th position in the 
Global Innovation Index Report 2018, America being the fourth (Dutta, Lanvin, & 
Wunsch-Vincent, 2018). In terms of general education, PISA tests on the skills of reading 
and science in 2015 have ranked Estonia amongst the top three performers. Oddly enough, 
although education is important for onsetting a company, a rigid and over-demanding 
educational system can impede imagination and innovation. (OECD, 2018)  
 
3. Data 
A database with the complete sample of accelerator participants from 2012 to 2017 is used, 
that bases on the crowdsourced database of an entrepreneurial community Estonian Mafia. 
Most variables and accelerated companies used in the analysis were added by the 
handpicked data from the Web, (e.g. largest crowdsourced databases seed.db and 
Cruncbase, webpages of accelerator companies, founders’ LinkedIn accounts) from 
information gathered via e-mails with accelerator companies and from Estonian business 
register and credit reports databases. Companies listed in the compiled database are only 
Estonian companies, meaning that a large quantity of the international companies Estonian 
accelerators have accelerated are left out from the analysis. The principle for adding a 
company as an Estonian company was its recognition as an Estonian company by 
accelerators, with the criterion of having Estonians as (co-)founders. Still, some Estonian-
founded companies (e.g. Sympower) are counted out, when they started to gain revenues 
only after being registered as a company in another country. At the end point of our data 
gathering by the first half of 2018, the analyzed accelerators had incubated 22 batches with 
57 Estonian companies and many more from other countries. 
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Figure 2. Numbers of startups that graduated accelerators in Estonia (author’s compilation)  
 
The gradual rise of startups participating is similar to the whole world (Drori & Wright, 
2018: 2-5). Despite the increase of the number of accelerators in 2014 and 2015, the 
amount of startups participated decreased in 2014, to rise again in 2015. 19 per cent of the 
accelerated 58 companies have quitted operations by 2018 with the average age of quitting 
being 3.6 years. Total numbers of Estonian startups accelerated by accelerators are shown 
in Figure 3. As a metric of success accelerators report the number of exits. Startup Wise 
Guys (after five years from program participation and establishment) and BuildIt (after two 
years from program participation and three years from establishment) have both 
experienced an exit. Both of these were early exits, considering that for VC startups as a 
reference base, a typical time to exit is seven to nine years (Hochberg, 2016: 34). 
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Figure 3. Estonian startups accelerated by Estonian accelerators from 2012-2018 (author’s 
compilation). 
 
Secondly, nine semi-structured, in-depth interviews with top-level representatives of all of 
the accelerators are conducted. A co-founder of Startup Wise Guys (1 h 10 min), a co-
founder of Gamefounders (1 h), two co-founders from BuildIt Accelerator (1 h 37 min) and 
all three executives of the Climate-KIC Accelerator over its existence (2 h 13 min) were 
interviewed. The existing connections and third-party introductions were drawn upon to 
reach the interviewees. Three interviews were conducted face-to-face, with one exception – 
Climate-KIC – carried out via Skype. All the interviews were recorded on the 
understanding that the data provided would remain confidential. Interviews focused on the 
topic of accelerators success and development over time. 	
4. Methods 
To offer thorough analysis of Estonian newly established accelerator field, the study is 
conducted in three stages outlined in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Three stages of the analysis (author’s compilation) 
 
Method Purpose Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variables 
Control variables 
Non-
parametric 
Kruskal-
Wallis H test 
To map and 
describe the 
accelerators in 
Estonia and 
explore their 
differences. 
First 
accelerator a 
startup has 
participated in 
Estonia. 
• Length of firm 
survival 
• Average 
employees 
growth 
• Funds from 
accelerator 
• Number of 
founders* 
• Women percentage 
from founders*  
• Field of activity*  
• Average sales 
growth  
• Accelerators’ 
influence on sales 
Stepwise OLS 
regression (2 
models) 
To capture the 
predictors of 
success of 
accelerated 
companies. 
• Average 
employees 
growth 
• Average 
sales growth  
• Length of firm 
survival 
• Average 
employees 
growth (if not 
dependent) 
• Funds from 
accelerator 
• Number of founders 
• Women percentage 
from founders  
• Field of activity  
• Average sales 
growth  
• Accelerators’ 
influence on sales 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
To identify 
accelerator 
success 
factors. 
- - - 
* - These variables significantly differentiate accelerators in Kruskal-Wallis H test 
 
At first, a preparatory Kruskal-Wallis H test is used to map and describe the four 
accelerators in Estonia. This non-parametric analysis gives a good overview of the 
differences between the accelerators. The dependent categorizing variable in this part of the 
analysis refers to the first accelerator a startup has participated in Estonia. Further analysis 
also considers only the participation in the first Estonian accelerator (two companies have 
participated in several). The values of this dependent variable stand for all the Estonian 
accelerators during the period under inquiry and are outlined in Appendix 1 together with 
the description of what these programs offer to their participants. Independent variables of 
this test are highlighted in Table 2 and explained in detail later. 
	 19 
 Stepwise OLS regression model is then applied to business growth metrics to 
capture the predictors of success of accelerated companies and compare these to theory. 
Two regression models are conducted, both having a differing focal independent variable 
that is used to measure success of accelerated startup companies. Startup growth measures 
are not unidimensional – one startup can experience growth in different ways than another 
(Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003). In the choice of proper growth indicators a list of 
measures proposed by Delmar (1997) is adjusted with the availability of data, these being 
assets, employment, market share, performance index and sales. Some indicators of the 
presented list are not relevant for comparing companies in different business areas. That 
said, performance index and market share are not comparable from industry to industry. 
And total asset value is influenced by the capital-intensity of a certain industry, therefore 
also being useless while comparing startups with different lines of activities. Considering 
this, the analysis focuses on sales and employment as the focal dependent variables, 
operationalized as average yearly employee growth and average yearly sales growth. Both 
of these are categorical variables with four values. Categories are based upon average 
scores on variables measuring yearly increase of employee growth and yearly increase of 
sales growth for all of the years a company has operated. Companies with no sales or 
employment data for two subsequent years are excluded from the analysis as missings, 
since the increase is not possible to identify. For the same reason also companies founded 
in 2017 are coded missing when using dependent variable ‘average yearly sales growth’, 
since their performance is not recorded by annual reports two subsequent years in a row. In 
a regression model with ‘average yearly employees growth’ as dependent, companies 
established in 2017 are included, while their values for 2018 are identified from the credit 
reports data. Some missing values on employment and sales were possible to substitute 
with the following logic: when sales in the first year of operation are unknown, but in the 
subsequent these are 0 or less than 3000 Euros and increasing exponentially later, then the 
first year is also coded as 0, otherwise missing. A technology-intensive company that has 
only operated one or two years and has no reported employment or sales numbers was 
coded 0 for both indicators. When number of employees is unknown, but employment costs 
are 0 or employee number in the subsequent years was 0, employees are coded as 0. If there 
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are some costs associated with employment, employment number is substituted with one 
less than the coming year or one more than the last year (depending on the costs of 
employment). For one company, which did not have any annual reports recorded, turnover 
instead of sales results coming from Tax and Customs Administration are used.  
 The four groups are formed on the basis of the yearly averages of these variables 
that are then categorized using visual binning technique in SPSS (with equal cut points of 
25% so that 4 possibly equal groups would form). The data points do not allow making 
thoroughly equal groups, but for sake of our analysis meaningful groups were formed. The 
frequency tables of the categories are shown in Appendix 2a and 2b. In a variable of 
employment growth the first group collates startups with average yearly increase in the 
number of employees less or equal to zero. This group is also the greatest, since there are 
several companies with no employees over the period of operation, representing 33% of 39 
startups that have values on this variable. The other three groups with positive employees 
growth compile 21-23 per cent of the cases. Similarly to the groups with employees 
growth, average yearly sales increase concentrated into almost equal four groups, with 
startups with negative sales growth making up the largest part – 37% – of all the 38 startups 
having values on this variable. The second group with the smallest positive increase in sales 
was the smallest, compiling 16 per cent of the cases, while the third group included 21 and 
the fourth 26 per cent of the companies. 
 The analysis of the mean scores and later quantitative modeling both consider the 
following independent variables. Length of firm survival and average employees growth 
had proven theoretically important, since the previous studies have associated it positively 
with accelerator participation. Two other concepts that earlier research associates with 
accelerator participation – growth in total amount of funding and speed of follow-up 
funding are left out from the analysis due to the constraints of data. Length of firm survival 
is measured in years between the establishment as mentioned in the business register and 
2018 (or quitting date). To be able to add characteristics from annual reports, then for 
companies established in the end of the year, next year is taken as an establishment date. In 
case there are no signs of activity in the past two years, a startup is marked as being quitted. 
When quitting time is not possible to identify, two years subsequent zero sales revenues are 
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taken as a marker of this. This coding is possible only when there have been reported sales 
in earlier years, since otherwise it may be, that a startup is so knowledge- or capital 
intensive that needs large investments and more time until the first sales. 
 The control variables were collected based on the limited available data describing 
startups that the author could collect from the mentioned online sources. As these, funds 
gained from the accelerator, number of founders and women percentage from founders are 
measured for their influence on startups. Whether a startups’ main field of activity concerns 
hard- or software (1- or 2), it is also considered. A hardware company produces 
technological devices or parts of devices or is innovating hardware with the main goal to 
provide materials based on it (e.g. Gelatex Technologies is developing a technological 
process to produce gelatine-based leather). When a company develops both, it is considered 
a hardware company, with exceptions only when hardware does not require technological 
innovations. A company is coded a software company if it does not produce physical 
product but code in its’ main area of business. Increase in sales is not much studied in 
relation to accelerators, although it has been one of the most frequently used success 
metrics for measuring company success (Delmar, 1997) and startups likely attend to 
accelerator programs to be able to improve their sales. It is controlled with two variables, 
one categorical variable depicting the average sales growth of a company during its 
development and the other depicting whether participated accelerator had a direct influence 
on the sales. The latter was operationalized, by tracking how many years after participation 
growth appeared. This variable is a dummy variable – when sales growth occurred 1 year 
after the accelerator, it is considered to be due to the participation and coded 1, when not, it 
is coded 0. 
 Since it is hard to study the outcomes of so early-stage companies, – only some of 
these gain further VC funding soon after the program or make quick exits (only one 
accelerated Estonian company has exited) – the quantitative inquiry into the phenomenon 
has several limits. This makes the full effect of accelerator participation hard to capture, 
even more so in case of younger accelerators. Therefore, as a third step, further analysis 
will explore what influences the success of accelerators in a greater detail, using semi-
structured interviews. Inductive and deductive content analysis is used to identify the core 
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elements of accelerator success factors in accelerator executives’ view. All interviews were 
transcribed verbatim in Estonian (the language of all the interviews) and translated when 
used in the article. The categories shown in Appendix 3 were assigned to all the 
theoretically relevant statements. Not all the statements fit into the categories from the 
theory, therefore new categories were added to the pre-defined ones. These new categories 
reflect the value of this study – the contextual differences that influence the success factors 
of accelerators. To verify coding reliability, the finalized text is sent to the interviewees. 
For the identification of the most important external success factors the values shown in 
Appendix 4 were assigned to the relevant statements reflecting the value. 
 
5. Results  
5. 1. Determining differences between accelerators 
First, all the four accelerators are compared by the descriptors of their participated 
companies to see whether accelerators differ in their startup portfolio with the Kruskal-
Wallis H test done in two stages: firstly, with characterictics that do not depend on time of 
establishment to be able to add more cases (also companies established in 2018) and the 
second stage with characteristics for which a company had to have been established earlier 
than 2017. The test showed that there is a statistically significant difference in Estonian 
accelerators between 
1) Percentage of women χ2(3) = 8.921, p = 0.030, with a mean rank of 24.74 for 
Startup Wise Guys, 26.77 for BuildIt, 38.40 for Climate-KIC and 30.50 for 
Gamefounders. 
2) Number of founders χ2(3) = 8.750, p = 0.033, with a mean rank of 31.59 for Startup 
Wise Guys, 35.00 for BuildIt, 18.67 for Climate-KIC and 32.50 for Gamefounders  
3) Hard- or software as a main business area χ2(3) = 18.294, p = 0.000, with a mean 
rank of 36.39 for Startup Wise Guys, 20.96 for BuildIt, 21.40 for Climate-KIC and 
38.50 for Gamefounders  
 
The contrasts highlighted by the data mark that in one way or another accelerators attract 
slightly different companies due reasons that should be further explained in the following 
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papers. Some reasoning is offered subsequently. Diverse portfolios may refer to differences 
in programs and their focus. Accelerators differ most significantly in their extent of 
inclusion of soft- or hardware companies, which is well explainable by the fact that two of 
the accelerators – Startup Wise Guys and Gamefounders – mostly invest in software and 
two of them – BuildIt and Climate-KIC – on hardware companies. The other considerable 
distinguisher is the proportion of women. An accelerator founder said openly:  
 
 ‘We’d like to have more women in the program, but only a few come.’ 
 
By the analysis, the greatest proportion of women are active in the Climate-KIC 
Accelerator, where only 33.3 per cent of the companies have no female founders. For other 
accelerators the tendency is more towards only male founders. An executive of Climate-
KIC offered one possible reason for it: 
 
‘I would speculate that women, when they take the risks associated with startups 
creation, often want to do things close to their heart – for many, the environment is 
such an issue.’ 
 
This intelligent guess that women are more likely to dedicate their energy to mission-driven 
entrepreneurship has also found proof in previous research (Hechavarria, Ingram, Justo, & 
Terjesen, 2012). 
 From these findings it is seen, that in terms of the success metrics (sales or 
employees growth or length of survival) the accelerators do not significantly differ. The 
differences, interpreted later in the discussion, come in comparing the control variables. 
Therefore it is expected that the predictors of startup success will be similar for the whole 
population of accelerated startups and turn to the second stage of analysis predicting factors 
influencing startup success in the overall population of accelerated startups. 
 
5.2. What influences accelerators’ success? 
Theory agrees that participating startup success is the main indicator of accelerator success.  
To explore the models that are most predictive to the successful startup, first the variable 
about the length of firm survival together with the control variables are incorporated in a 
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stepwise regression procedure to see their effects on average yearly employee growth. The 
resulting regression model is reported in Table 3. This model includes only control 
variables average yearly sales growth and funds gained from the accelerator as predictors, 
both of which have statistically significant effects on startups’ employee growth. 
 When setting average yearly employee growth, length of firm survival and control 
variables to the model with average yearly sales growth as a dependent variable, the 
resulting regression model includes average yearly employees growth and company’s field 
of activity (hard- or software) as predictors, both of which have statistically significant 
effects on startup sales growth. Both models are tested for homoscedasticity, 
multicollinearity and normality. 
 
Table 3. Estimates (and standard errors) of OLS regression predicting accelerated startup 
success by average yearly employee and sales growth (author’s analysis) 
 
 Model 1: Average 
yearly employees 
growth 
Model 2: Average yearly 
sales growth 
Funds gained from the accelerator .370*(.000) .144 
Average yearly sales growth .436**(.136) - 
Average yearly employees growth - .549***(.132) 
Hard- or software -.063 .311*(.352) 
 
Accelerator company 
 
.187 
 
-.160 
Sales growth due accelerator -.064 .042 
Number of founders 
Women percentage from founders 
-.009 
.142 
.028 
-.220 
Length of firm survival -.041 -.026 
     *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
      Note: N(Model 1)=37; N=(Model 2)=37 
      R2(Model 1)=.440; baseline R2=.375  R2(Model 2)=.423; baseline R2=.381 
      VIF(Model 1)<2; VIF(Model 2)<2 
     Source: Author’s compilation 
  
The general pattern appearing in these models is that they include only some of the added 
independent and control variables. Considering that the correlation between sales growth 
and employees growth was assumable – both of these variables are metrics of startup 
success – only one significant relationship remained for both dependent variables. 
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 Higher funds gained from accelerator are predicting average yearly employees 
growth. More specifically, with every step of the increase in the group of average yearly 
employees growth it is likely that funds provided by the first Estonian accelerator a startup 
participated in were greater (b=.370). 
 Average yearly sales growth was linked to the type of a company’s main field of 
activity. One group increase in average yearly sales growth means that a startup is more 
likely to be a provider of software (b=.311). Some of the interviews offer possible 
explanation for that in the differing market penetration characters of the two types: 
 
‘Typically it takes more time for hardware startups to launch their products.’ 
 
‘Hardware is slower, more capital-intensive. It is much easier to scale with software. I 
have a friend driving Click&Grow and they have done hard work for ten years and 
started to really scale only recently.’ 
 
Despite the expectations, length of firm survival does not predict increasing success by 
either criteria. Similarly insignificant are the effects of the participated first Estonian 
accelerator, sales growth due accelerator, number of founders and women percentage from 
founders. 
 Continuing with the interviews, Table 4 presents an overview of the findings of 
what interviewees identified as internal success factors of accelerators (that in turn lead to 
successful accelerated startups). All internal success factor categories reported by all seven 
interviewees are discussed in descending order of salience. Most important internal success 
factors are reported in gray. 
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Table 4. Internal success factors of accelerators by descending order of salience (author’s 
compilation) 
 
Success factor Salience 
Social networks 
creation 
100% 
Startup selection 100% 
Reputation 100% 
Mentorship 92% 
Batches 92% 
Fund allocation* 83% 
Focusing on certain 
stages 
75% 
Program type* 67% 
            * - salience is arguable 	
The first-sight interpretation from Table 4 is that the lower the salience, the more arguable 
the categorization on the scale ‘Very important’-‘Not important’. Thus the most salient 
factors for accelerator success are more uniformly considered important by interviewees 
than the least. The three most salient success factors were considered solidly important by 
all the accelerator executives, these being social networks creation by accelerator, deal 
flow/startup selection and reputation. None of the factors were proven unimportant by all 
the respondents. 
 Social networks creation was uniformly confirmed to be very important by all the 
leaders of accelerators. 
 
‘What is the product of an accelerator? The product of an accelerator is selling a 
network. Why would you like to get into Y Combinator? Since it is totally incredible, 
with whom they can introduce you to. Whether you take 20 000 [Euros] from Y 
Combinator or as a governments’ grant... everybody would always choose Y 
Combinator. […] Even so that during the completion of some top-accelerators you can 
access people some cannot get close to even when they move around conferences for ten 
years. These high-level contacts mean everything.’ 
 
‘We have good relations with the investors of the whole region and we could introduce 
them to whoever. […] They [a startup in a batch] tried to talk to those funds themselves 
– everything moved very slowly, while everybody is busy. But since I know these 
people personally, then I can tell them that let’s make the decision this week. And they 
do it. They take that time and they make these calls during travel from Tokyo, since we 
have good relations. But startups cannot get them doing all of this.’ 
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Not only network opportunities with investors were valued, but the fact that a participant 
could meet with other teams in international programs such as Climate-KIC, was also 
emphasized by an interviewee: 
 
‘It is very much appreciated that founders can meet with likeminded startups, who 
operate in similar fields. Usually they share very good contacts from their countries in 
these meetings.’ 
 
A representative of a public climate-focused accelerator also emphasized the fact others did 
not mention – networking with local policy-makers:  
 
‘The governmental input is also very important for our teams, since policymaking 
becomes increasingly important in these [environmental] themes and state’s interest 
becomes apparent as to what regulations or legislations are of interest to startups – what 
hinders them or what would be these small changes that would make them develop more 
quickly.’ 
 
Startup selection possibilities were among top three internal success factors, since success 
of an accelerator was seen in a strong correlation with startup success later on. Therefore 
every accelerator had lengthy criteria for screening out the best teams. At least one of the 
accelerators even has a resourcing team for finding the startups worldwide. 
 
‘Finding strong founders and their validation by evaluating product and market, this is 
essential. The most important, I think.’ 
 
‘The three major criteria are team, market and product and we value team the most, 
since we enter at a so early stage, where it is really not possible to compute anything in 
Excel – there may be no finances yet.’ 
 
Reputation can be taken as a success metric, but it can also be added to the list of internal 
success factors, since it came out from all the interviews as very important for accelerators’ 
success. It is decisive for deal flow. 
 
‘But one thing that for me is a measure of success is how much we have been invited to 
speak about out experiences. And I have personally been invited to speak about our 
accelerator in more than 20 countries.’ 
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And not only is it the international recognition, but a very important aspect of reputation is 
recognition through successful startups that have finished the program – these are 
advertising the accelerator to their new contacts. 
 
‘At first, nobody knows you. The best way to build reputation is the success of your 
pupils. Y Combinator was no one before it accidentally got AirBnb and Dropbox to its 
portfolio. After that they are the idols of this world.’ 
 
Mentorship is also important. Reasons for this were similar: 
 
‘Workshops and the mentoring have to be of good quality. Otherwise it would not be 
possible to find participants for next batches. Mentors, also, do not want to participate in 
programs, where other mentors are not professional.’ 
 
An interviewee found that despite mentorship being a very important component for a 
successful accelerator program, in reality programs could sometimes overexert with it: 
 
‘In reality, it would be much-much better, when there would be less mentor-meetings. 
But you almost cannot go on doing this, since then you would automatically get a poor 
valuation, so to speak, from the teams. They have a feeling that the schedule has to be 
tight. Although, in reality, the best thing they could do is to build their company [instead 
of too many training sessions] and maybe exchange thoughts to somebody once a week.’ 
 
Operating in batches instead of continuous intake was found important for being able to run 
the qualified program. And although Barnes (2016) found there to be no significant 
difference between batch size and initial money raised during a program, several 
accelerator representatives brought out the optimal batch size for the synergies to occur: 
 
‘Our Techstars-type business model does not work taking companies one by one, maybe 
some do. You can only do it like that and, to my mind, all the accelerators do – 
incubators not. It is just part of the business model. […] This is a totally systematic 
curriculum they have to pass. And you cannot do it one by one, you cannot start all over 
again every month, but have to bring startups together. Economically it does not work 
when there are much less than 10 companies.’ 
 
‘By my experience, the minimum is eight. Then some kind of feeling of belonging starts 
to work and teams help each other. The biggest batch we have had so far was eleven 
teams and I felt that the community feeling was the greatest in there. Teams went out to 
drink beer and do all sorts of stuff. Ten is the optimal.’ 
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Operating with companies in similar stages of development is not so easy to do, although it 
would significantly increase the effectiveness of the program by the words of several 
respondents: 
 
‘If they are in very different phases, it is difficult to offer value to everybody. In this 
accelerator we tried to include teams that were on almost similar level, but it actually 
ended up not being so. Some of the teams were a little bit further in the development and 
these were also the most successful ones in the program.’ 
 
With respect to fund allocation and program type there were more multitudinous opinions. 
Main conclusions that the author drew from the discussions were that fund allocation 
depends largely on the needs of a concrete startup and also on the development stage of an 
accelerator. A diverse portfolio of vertical (specialized) and horizontal (universal) 
accelerators was found to be good in terms of the selection opportunities for startups. 
 More exploratory were what concerns the external environment that influences 
accelerators. The interest of the present paper lies on the times of establishment of 
accelerators as well as what influences these now. Four external influencers were 
mentioned by the practitioners, – business environment, educational environment, human 
capital and policy direction – but not always in a positive correlation. Most intriguing were 
discussions about effects of political actors, followed by human capital, business 
environment and educational factors with the numbers of references shown on Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. References to external success factors of accelerators from the interviews. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
 
A critical factor in concerning the establishment of the accelerators mentioned by all was 
policy direction. The discussions about policy contexts of the times of starting accelerators 
were in connection with grants – all of the accelerators agreed that without a kick-start 
funding from public sources, an accelerator is too costly of a project to start with. Every 
Estonian accelerator was granted some government funding in their earlier stages of 
development. 
 
‘It is not possible or during that time it was not possible to do an accelerator in Estonia 
without public support. When looking at experiences abroad, then there are three 
options: whether the support comes from the public sector, a big corporation […]. And 
the third option is that some accelerators compile funds that are a little bigger already 
from the start, to be able to take money for operating costs. […] We could not 
immediately find a corporate partner – there are not many in Estonia.’  
 
‘The availability of the grant was the catalyst that made the founding team working hard 
to establish the accelerator.’ 
 
And not only was the government funding seen as a representation of a policy direction – 
during the first half of the last decade when the phenomenon of accelerators took up as a 
global trend, the Estonian governmental development agency held discussions over the 
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need of these in Estonia. The decision was positive and a fund for accelerator establishment 
was created. But in some years time accelerator companies were left unfunded, reportedly 
too quickly. In small Estonia, without much other possibilities for a financing partner, 
companies moved away to get public support elsewhere – Gamefounders to Malaysia and 
BuildIt to Riga. Startup Wise Guys did widen their activities to Riga and Vilnius, but was 
already thus far to be able to finance the accelerator from mostly private funds and 
therefore did not move the headquarter. 
 
‘Most die [when public support disappears]. But the first five years was very hard as 
always in business – we had to do all sorts of tricks to survive.’ 
 
But while the accelerators survived by using the regular business logic and moving their 
finances to places where funds were guaranteed, they question if it was a sustainable move 
in order to secure the vitality of large investments once made for establishing accelerator 
ecosystem by Estonian government: 
 
‘We had the whole system built up – at some point we did as much work as we could for 
creating the brand and mentor network. […] We had over 100 very strong mentors 
whom we flew here from the US and England. But as the state had not had thought 
about supporting this activity further, I would say the investment that the country made 
in the first place was relatively useless and right now Latvia tastes fruits of this Estonian 
investment.’ 
 
‘Of course it is the role of a state to eliminate market failures and that is what they did – 
they helped somebody to the market. But we are not so convinced that what they do now 
is quite right. But we are happy that we do not need to deal with the state, because it is 
quite an annoying partner, so to say. One should not really have partner relationships 
with the state, although in Europe almost all risk capital funds come from public sources 
like European Investment Fund and others… we do not get by without. And countries 
actually have a great interest to boost their economies and bring about the structural 
change that the new economy allows – that is what they really need… sewing factories 
are closed down one by one, since these are not possible to uphold considering the level 
of wages we have. And countries need the structural change, to change to the new 
sustainable economy. Lithuania has taken a different approach than Estonia. They said 
they do not want more than only a small prearranged return on investment, since they 
want to boost the economy [through the investments to accelerated companies] – 
everything else goes to private investors. Of course, they also want some small returns, 
but this is a clear economy-boosting model. Our country maximizes profits as some 
bank or investment fund.’ 
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All the accelerators were granted some government funding and what was similar was that 
all of the starting programs were based on sources of experiences present during 
establishment. Climate-KIC was and is still based on the program from European-wide 
network of experts. BuildIt based on the experiences from incubator programs from Tartu’s 
Science Park and hoped to fill the cavity of accelerator financing platform for Tartu’s 
ecosystem of hardware experts. Startup Wise Guys included world-renowned accelerator 
program experts as co-founders. The presence of the willing participants was a key for 
accelerator success and there were people with expert knowledge in a diversity of fields 
thinking about starting a company. 
 
‘Inevitably, in order to do this, we needed participants who had to be in a rather mature 
phase, since the accelerator follows ClimateLaunchpad and other preparatory programs 
for more early-stage startups.’ 
 
Opinions differ in terms of whether the quality of participants was high or low. It might 
have been high for experts, but as an accelerator-maker believes, it still is low considering 
economic expertise due short period of time a free economy with private businesses had 
been present in Estonia: 
 
‘Our focus is Central and Eastern Europe, since we believe that there is a lot of technical 
talent in the area, but they know little about how to develop businesses, since their 
parents were not able to own businesses during the Soviet times. There is a lack of this 
business knowledge carried forward from generation to generation. In my opinion only 
ten people out of 100 can do business and only one of these is able to startup. […] And 
we see that these technology-focused founders need help for building up scalable 
businesses. We are the virtual co-founders or foster parents, who teach this business-
side.’ 
 
All in all, accelerators are usually present where human capital is: 
 
‘Now we have expanding our marketing activities to involve Turkey – there is a lot of 
technical talent in Turkey and people want to move out of there. We have at least three 
strong Turkish teams in our portfolio.’ 
 
But even the different logic is possible – when other aspects are sufficient for accelerators’ 
support, accelerators can play a large part in building this human capital: 
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‘While we held the program, several game-focused university curricula and university 
subjects were created in Estonia.’ 
 
With respect to business environment, three aspects were brought out as favorable to 
accelerators – Tartu’s living environment by BuildIt, global clean-tech and hardware 
technology trends by Climate-KIC and BuildIt and economic environment by BuildIt, that 
used the logic ‘follow the money’ in moving its operations to Latvia.  
 Surprisingly educational factors were mentioned only by one accelerator and in a 
negative context. 
 
‘Of course it plays a role – it is very hard to do this in Tartu. [...] Yes, Tartu’s Science 
Park was a strategic partner here – one of the founders. But we have never had 
cooperation on this level with the University of Tartu. And the attitude of the university 
has been rather negative towards what we do, I would say.’ 
 
‘Our preliminary hypothesis that we get teams from the university is not supported. In 
reality, we have not invested in any of the university teams.’ 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This article demonstrates that in order to discover accelerator success factors and 
strengthen them, we need to understand specific contexts of areas under inquiry. Exploring 
external success factors next to the internal ones instruct in doing so. The article explored 
the success-factors of Estonian accelerators and accelerated startups with employing 
complete sample of accelerators and their participants, which is unique in accelerator 
research thus far. Other important contributions of the study were offering contextual 
diversity for studies of accelerators by providing the example of Estonia, using mixed 
methods in studying the phenomenon and, most importantly, exploring the internal and 
external success factors of specifically accelerator-type business models. 
 Success of an accelerated startup is theoretically explained by the success metrics of 
startups by earlier studies. The leading idea tested in this article is that the newly formed 
body of accelerators research should not ignore contexts of countries under inquiry in the 
process of theory-formation, otherwise theories considering the concept will become 
context-inclined and not usable universally. Therefore these metrics were tested in the 
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context of Estonia – a country where accelerators have had little time to develop. 
Regression models revealed that the size of funds gained from the accelerator, average 
yearly sales and employees growth and being a software company are predictive of a 
success of accelerated startups. Funds gained from the accelerator as a significant predictor 
of higher average yearly employees growth was held of theoretical importance earlier as 
well as length of firm. The latter was not found so for these data. Explanation for this may 
be that accelerators are a new phenomena in Estonia and therefore the longevity of startups 
is not yet comparable in quantitative datasets on a significant level – over 30 per cent of 
the analyzed companies did not manage to have any sales or employee growth during the 
short period of their existence. Although our data covers all the accelerators and their 
participating startups, due to the access of limited data, only a few theoretically relevant 
concepts could have been analyzed. 
 To study what influences the success of the accelerators themselves, in-depth 
discoveries of the internal and external success-factors of different acceleration programs 
provided were given. The three most salient internal success factors were considered 
solidly important by all the accelerator executives, these being social networks creation by 
accelerator, deal flow/startup selection and reputation of an accelerator. Studies on the 
effects of accelerator reputation to its success are not found in earlier research, although 
this is referred to as an important factor by the overview articles (Drori & Wright, 2018: 13; 
Isabelle, 2013: 19-20). Where the contextual differences of Estonia strongly came in were 
the statements of interviewees about the external success factors, because policy and 
business environment of a country with respect to accelerators come out as existential 
factors for accelerator presence. Interviews reflected upon accelerators as important policy 
tools, mostly since the establishment of one is not possible without public support. Giving 
accelerators positive effects on startups growth studied in earlier theoretical literature, 
public sector as an important stakeholder should be interested in building models for 
sustainable support of accelerators. 	 Analysis of the success metrics of accelerated startups revealed that some 
accelerators attract more female founders than others for reasons that should be further 
explained in the following papers. The regression models for analysing what causes 
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accelerated startups success were able to compare success groups inside the uniform 
population of accelerator participants only. In further studies, it would be interesting to 
compare the groups of accelerated versus non-accelerated companies in order to analyze the 
possible differences in accelerated startup success predictors in a diversity of contexts. This 
analysis would advance the understanding of the accelerator-offered qualities. Later 
analysis could also add to the theory-formation when studying the external factors in 
different contexts and internationally in more detail. The focused comparison of USA 
and Estonia may be an interesting starting point in this, as shown presently. 
 To conclude, all three parts of the study revealed some deviations from the earlier 
studies of accelerators – one considering a totally new concept to analyze (external success 
factors) in accelerator literature – focusing on the possible differences along cultural lines. 
Therefore this study contributes to the scarce literature (Yin & Luo, 2018) on the recent 
phenomenon of accelerators. 
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Appendix 1. Properties of Estonian accelerators of 2012-2018 (values of Accelerator1) 
(author’s compilation). 
 
 Startup Wise 
Guys (1) 
BuildIt (2) Climate-KIC 
Accelerator (3) 
Gamefounders 
(4) (no new 
batches since 
2014) 
Established 2012 2014 2015 2012 
Description Europe's most 
experienced B2B 
startup 
accelerator. 
 
Buildit is 
an accelerator 
for new global 
success stories 
in hardware and 
IoT. 
Europe's 
largest  green 
tech accelerator 
for early stage 
startups. 
Accelerator for 
teams of 
gamification. 
Number of 
accelerated 
startups (until the 
first half of 2018) 
101 
 
 
48 18 28 
Type Horizontal Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Head-quarter Tallinn (Estonia) Tartu (Estonia), 
since 2017 Riga 
(Latvia) 
Brussels 
(Belgium), 
Estonian 
program in 
Tallinn 
(Estonia) 
Tallinn 
(Estonia), since 
2015 Kuala 
Lumpur 
(Malaysia) 
Location of 
program (until 
2017) 
Tallinn (Estonia), 
Riga (Latvia) 
Tartu (Estonia) Europe-wide Tallinn 
(Estonia), since 
2015 Kuala 
Lumpur         
(Malaysia) 
Program length 3 months 6 weeks 6 moths 3 months 
Funding amount Up to 30 000 
EUR 
Up to 50 000 
EUR 
 
Up to 50 000 
EUR 
Up to 15 000 
EUR 
 
Funding type For equity 
 
For equity 
 
Equity-free For equity 
Mentors Dedicated highly 
rated coaches and 
access to 150+ 
world-class 
business mentors 
16 world-class 
mentors 
Some of the 
best clean-tech 
mentors from 
Climate-KIC 
European-wide 
network 
World-class 
mentors 
 
Co-working space Yes Yes Yes Yes 
*Until 2014 (incl.) 
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Appendix 2a. Groups of average yearly employee growth by average yearly increase of 
employees (author’s compilation). 
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Appendix 2b. Groups of average yearly sales growth by average yearly increase in sales 
(Euros) (author’s compilation). 
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Appendix 4. Categories and codes for external and internal success factors (author’s 
compilation). 
 
Categories Codes Questions 
External success factors  If and how accelerators are 
influenced by their external context 
(e.g. political, economic, social, 
educational, cultural)? 
 
Which external factors did affect 
accelerators during their 
establishment? Whether there were 
external factors that influenced the 
starting of the accelerator just then?  
Business environment 
factors 
Business environment 
Economic environment  
Global business 
environment 
Living environment 
 
Educational factors Educational factors  
Human capital Human capital  
Policy direction Policy direction  
Accessible markets* Accessible markets  
Cultural support* Cultural support  
Internal success factors   
Batches Batches Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by taking startups into the program 
in batches? Is it very important, 
important or not very important? 
 
How does operating in batches 
influence accelerators? 
Focusing on certain 
stages 
Focusing on certain stages Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by focusing on startups of similar 
stages? Is it very important, 
important or not very important? 
 
How does operating with startups of 
similar stages influence 
accelerators?  
Fund allocation Fund allocation Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by their funding of startups and the 
amount of funds? Is it very 
important, important or not very 
important? 
 
How does the fact of fund allocation 
to startups influence accelerators?  
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* - Not mentioned in interviews 
** - Came out from the interviews as being important	
 
 
Appendix 4. Coding scheme for internal success factors 	
Value Meaning Example 
1 Not important  
2 Important  
3 Very important  
 
Mentorship Strength of 
mentors/program 
Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by mentors? Is the strength of 
mentorship very important, 
important or not very important? 
 
How does mentorship strength 
influence accelerators?  
Program type Horizontal versus vertical 
program 
Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by focusing on certain technology 
or field of activity? Is it very 
important, important or not very 
important? 
 
How does focusing on certain 
technology or field of activity 
influence accelerators?   
Social networks 
creation 
Social networks creation Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by their social networks creation? Is 
it very important, important or not 
very important? 
 
How does social networks creation 
influence accelerators?   
Startup selection Startup selection Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by the selection of startups? Is it 
very important, important or not 
very important? 
 
How do possibilities of startup 
selection influence accelerators?  
Reputation** Reputation by recognition 
Reputation by recognizing 
through successful startups 
Is accelerators’ success influenced 
by its reputation? Is it very 
important, important or not very 
important? 
 
How does reputation influence 
accelerators?  
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